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A Proposal for a Project on Future United States
Problems in the Satellite States

I. The Problem

1. The ultimate independence of what are now the European Soviet satellites and their integration into a broader European framework are now policy objectives of the United States. It is essential that the Government examine and understand the problems which the United States is likely to confront, from the present forward, in achieving those objectives. The weakening or removal of Soviet control might come about in a number of different ways; abrupt or gradual, by violence or political evolution, under conservative or Titoist auspices, etc. Accordingly, to be prepared for all likely contingencies, the U. S. must consider alternative future courses of events, and the problems each poses for us.

2. Our objectives in this area are usually formulated negatively. We know we want the removal of intimate Soviet control over the satellites, but we are not very clear as to the nature of the positive alternative form of organization which might meet American interests.

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Our proximate concern is a simple one: that these areas be so organized in the future that their offensive potential be available neither to the Soviet Union nor to any other power which might threaten the security interest of the United States.

Clearly, however, this is at best an incomplete statement of what we want. This objective could be secured by political and economic domination of these countries by the U.S., but this alternative is both impractical and inconsistent with our basic political philosophy.

What we seek, in the end, is a situation in which these countries are a force for peace because of their own internal political development and not primarily because they are subjected either to a foreign power or to the police action of some international organizational machinery. Ultimately we want this area strong, independent, and standing on its own feet, but so organized internally and in its relations to its neighbors and the United States that its strength will be used to reinforce rather than undermine international security.

This is our minimum goal against which must be tested the various actions we might take to hasten the lifting of the Soviet yoke. The achievement of this goal is probably conditional upon the achievement of a variety of subgoals, including such

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developments in Eastern Europe as economic advance, the broadening of the popular base of shared power, the achievement of national respect, and a role in the positive shaping of the European continent. The examination of the prospects for some of these sub-goals under alternative assumptions about the course of events in coming months and years, is one of the proposed tasks of our project.


II. Reasons for a Study

3. What we propose is a study which would examine in the light of a re-evaluation of the minimum objectives of the U.S. beyond "liberation", the likely ways in which weakening of Soviet domination might come about, the possible longer run consequences of each for the organization of Eastern Europe and in turn for U.S. objectives, and the margins of influence which the U.S. might be capable of exerting over each of these trends.

A study of this sort is important for two reasons. First, it is important that we should be as well prepared as possible to meet problems we may have to face in the future. Our attention has been so concentrated on the immediate problem of what is often loosely referred to as "liberation" that we are perhaps inadequately aware of the problems we would face if underground movements were to be successful in seizing power, if a satellite

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regime were to make a Titoist break, if an emigre group were to move into power on the heels of an allied army after a general war, or if a Kremlin crisis were to reduce a satellite to disorganized confusion. Many of these problems cannot now be foreseen. It would be foolish to exaggerate what a research program can do, or to pretend that any sort of forecasting is possible. Nonetheless, a careful study of present and past evidence can at least highlight some of the possible complex problems we may face and provide in advance some of the background that will be needed to understand these problems if and when they arise.

The second reason why an investigation of this sort is important is that actions the U.S. takes now may affect the way in which the weakening or removal of Soviet domination comes about. Again it would be unrealistic to exaggerate U.S. influence. We cannot unilaterally produce a result in Eastern Europe for which powerful historic forces in the area are not already working. But recent events in Germany and elsewhere as well as in Russia have demonstrated that history is indeed on the march and that political forces both in the satellites and in Moscow are far from static. In this situation we do have an influence, however marginal, both through our acts and through the conception of the available alternatives that we place in

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men's minds. The Center believes that a research group can make some contribution to the background information which U.S. officials require to appraise the consequences of such alternative current policies as the support or nonsupport of resistance groups, the making of such diplomatic proposals as various schemes for German unification or for the organization of Eastern Europe, the nature of relations with exiled leaders, our attitude toward east-west trade, etc.

III. What the Study Would Cover

4. In organizing a study of this kind there are a number of dimensions in terms of which the problem can be broken down. These overlap and cut across one another, and we are not yet prepared to propose a project outline that integrates them all. Some attention, however, should be paid to each. The first is an examination of the various ways in which a weakening of Soviet control might come about. These might be listed as follows:

- a. Various forms of partial or complete Russian withdrawal from part or all of Eastern Europe as a result of negotiations within the U.N., big power conversations, or bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, or unilateral Soviet retrenchment. "Withdrawal" might be

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purely formal, consisting of announced evacuation of troops with control retained through secret police, or it might involve weakening of other forms of control as well. Various possibilities should be considered, especially those the Russians might initially regard as token but which we might exploit with more substantive results.

- b. A decline in Russian power within certain of the satellites sufficient to permit their separation either by revolt or by Titoist signs of independence from the Soviet orbit without causing general war.
- c. A violent internal convulsion within the Russian government resulting in a collapse of effective control within the satellites.
- d. A general war between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World.

5. Another dimension of the problem concerns the various kinds of groups which might come to power in the satellites as Soviet power weakened. This suggests the following topics:

- a. The potential role of resistance and guerrilla movements in certain of the satellite states. Some estimate would be attempted of the forms of resistance possible, the support required from the outside, and the possible effectiveness of resistance in weakening Soviet control. For the

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most part, however, the detailed appraisal of the present capabilities of resistance groups can be made much better inside the government. Our efforts here would be mainly concentrated on the political, economic, and social consequences of resistance, both within the area immediately involved and in other areas indirectly affected, especially the consequences for the countries and for the U.S. of the actual assumption of power by a successful resistance movement.

b. The possibilities and consequences of National Communist defections (Titoism). This will include study of the likelihood that indigenous communist leadership is strong enough and independent enough to undertake such defections in the foreseeable future, consideration of U.S. policies or moves which might encourage such defections, and of U.S. support that would be required to insure success of a break away. Again, however, special emphasis would be placed on the probable consequences for our objectives of such defections if successful, and on policies we might pursue to render these consequences favorable.

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c. The problems inherent in relations with governments-in-exile and refugee and defector groups. This will cover the position and prestige of these groups at home, the general political leanings of the more important elements, the internal cohesion and capabilities for leadership of the various groups, and their influence in the United States and in the other free nations. We would once again pose the question: should they come to power, what might we expect?

d. The possible survival and postliberation emergence of potential national leaders who will have remained politically inactive under the communist regime. (This may include some professional men, soldiers, elder statesmen under varying forms of imprisonment or forced retirement and younger men who have never participated in public life.) This will cover the likelihood that men of the necessary character and ability exist in the satellites after the years of communist purges and police rule and the chances of their achieving the needed reputation and stature to gain national office and authority. The study should also examine ways in which such men can be identified at the time of Soviet withdrawal and, where suitable, the ways in which the U.S. can guide and assist them.

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6. A third dimension of the problem breaks it according to the major problems and issues which would be faced by the European satellite area as a whole if it found itself partly or wholly freed from Soviet domination. These include:

- a. The relations of a unified Germany to the rest of the area. An economically strong Germany can be a great asset to, for example, the Danube Basin, but it is important both from the standpoint of international security and from that of the dignity and independence of these peoples that they not be dominated by Germany. Indeed the problem of Germany's potential future role in an independent Europe hits at the heart of many of the other problems of the project.
- b. The disputes over national boundaries, irredentist minorities and the like that have become the principal pre-occupation of these peoples whenever they have been relatively free of outside control. It would be a mistake for a project such as this to try to draw a future map of Eastern Europe, but a checklist of the major boundary issues certain to arise and some consideration of what machinery might be set up to deal with them could be attempted.
- c. The reorientation of the economies of the region to a world trading pattern. Several years of Soviet direction of these economies has left them with different assets and

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a different structure from that existing prewar. To plunge them suddenly into competition with the West may well produce strains that could negate the benefits of wise political action. Their relations with each other, with Germany, and with such supra-national institutions as the European Coal and Steel Authority need examination.

d. The international political organization of the area. Is an Eastern European federation wise or possible? Some of these countries will no doubt wish to re-establish the kind of relation with France they had before the war as a check on German resurgence. Is their absorption into the European Defense Community desirable and how should it be brought about?

7. Finally, the results of these studies will provide the basis for a concluding paper. This will be a survey of the nature and scale of the activities within the satellites that our own interest may require us to undertake, both during and after the period of Soviet withdrawal. This would cover:

- a. The selection, sponsorship, and support of promising government leaders.
- b. Provision of advice (and instructions?) to new national and regional leaders on their problems of recovery.

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c. Delivery of economic support and assistance to advance reconstruction and rehabilitation.

d. The possible introduction of troops to help maintain order and to supervise elections.

e. The administration of disputed areas pending the establishment of regional authorities or the allocation of such areas among the claimants.

IV. Why Should the Project Be Done [REDACTED]

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This project appears to fit many of the criteria [REDACTED]

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attempts to apply in deciding whether a project is appropriate to our capabilities.

1. The problems it poses may become urgent at any time, but at the moment they appear too contingent and remote to justify extended research within the government.

2. The studies will touch on the areas of responsibility of many operating arms of the government, but the project as a whole is hardly justified by the needs of any one.

3. The problems have both intelligence and policy aspects. They require research on the areas concerned and analysis of the U.S. interest and capabilities.

4. The project further requires an examination of various influences and limitations on U.S. foreign policy that can perhaps

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be more effectively conducted outside of the government structure. This study must deal with traditional ties, agreements with present allies, domestic, political pressures, etc.

5. The topics are researchable in that each constitutes a body of information to which scholarly examination can make a significant contribution, and in which the Government is presently deficient.

By its nature the project is one of long-range research. While its product can and will supplement the short-term intelligence intake of the Government, it cannot be considered a substitute for the procurement of current intelligence on events in the satellites or as a direct basis for tactical operational planning.

In this as in its other projects [] recognizes that an academic group at a distance from detailed government operations cannot presume to make detailed policy recommendations. In this sense this is not conceived as a "policy" project. On the other hand our researches will be relevant and useful only if we spell out the policy implications of our findings. Thus the project is intended to assist policy makers by defining the problems we may confront and the alternatives that may be open to us.

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